The incentive-alignment benefits of equity-lined compensation are well-known, but relatively little attention has been devoted to identifying and measuring certain deadweight costs that inevitably accompany such programs. To properly align incentives, the firm's managers must be exposed to firm-specific risks, but this forced concentrated exposure prevents the manager from optimal portfolio diversification. Because undiversified managers are exposed to the firm's total risk, but rewarded (through expected returns) for only the systematic portion of that risk, managers will value stock or option-based compensation at less than its market value. This paper derives a method to measure this deadweight cost, which empirically can be quite large: managers at the average NYSE firm who have their entire wealth invested in the firm value their options at 70% of their market value, while undiversified managers at rapidly growing, entrepreneurially-based firms, such as Internet-based firms, value their option-based compensation at only 53% of its cost to the firm. These estimates prompt questions of whether compensation plans in such firms are weighted too heavily towards incentive-alignment to be cost effective.
I. Introduction
Finance theory has long made the case for the use of equity-linked compensation plans as an effective means to align managers' incentives with those of shareholders. In the last decade, finance practice, particularly in the United States, has embraced this prescription, with stockoptions and restricted-stock plans forming a vastly increased proportion of senior management's total compensation. Although financial theory recognizes that the benefits from these plans are inevitably tempered by certain deadweight costs to the firm, relatively little empirical work has been devoted to identifying and measuring those costs. In essence, the exposure to firm-specific risk that is essential for generating the right managerial incentives also imposes a cost on managers by compelling them to hold less-than-fully-diversified investment portfolios. Every firm faces this unavoidable tension between incentive alignment and portfolio diversification; the optimal tradeoff between them will differ from firm to firm. This paper focuses on the costs associated with this tradeoff, where the cost reflects the difference between the market value of the instruments granted, and the value placed on those instruments by the managers who receive them as substitutes for cash compensation.
As managerial diversification declines, the "efficiency" of awarding equity-linked compensation suffers. More precisely, the value of equity-linked compensation to undiversified managers may be much less than the cost of providing this compensation to the firm. The undiversified manager is exposed to the total volatility of the firm, whereas diversified investors bear (and are paid for) only the systematic portion of the firm's risk. The managers' expected returns are therefore too low to properly compensate them for the risks they face. Consequently, the value that undiversified managers place on equity-based compensation is less than its market value.
Viewed in isolation from its incentive alignment benefits, this difference between the value of equity-based compensation to undiversified managers, and the market-value of the equity-linked security, represents a deadweight loss to the firm. That is, the firm could receive the full value of equity-linked securities to a diversified investor by simply issuing such securities in the open market. The deadweight loss, then, consists of non-negative difference between the higher value of the securities to a diversified investor, and the lower value of the securities to the non-3 diversified employee. 1 This loss is greatest for high-volatility firms where managers have most of their personal wealth tied up in the firm. This paper offers a technique to measure the difference in value between the firm's cost of issuing equity, and the value that undiversified investors place on this form of compensation. The paper departs from the previous finance and accounting literature on private valuation of executive stock options by focusing on the costs explicitly incurred due to the loss of diversification.
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The paper also advances our understanding of the cost of risk. Most principalagent models assume that all types of risk, whether systematic or non-systematic, are equally costly to managers (agents). In contrast, this paper identifies non-systematic, firm-specific risk as more costly to managers, because the expected market return fairly compensates managers for bearing systematic risk, but does not compensate the managers for bearing non-systematic risk.
And indeed, while financial engineering has the potential to reduce the manager's exposure to systematic risk, managers must be exposed to this non-systematic, firm-specific risk to produce the right incentives. This paper then applies the suggested technique to measure the private value a manager places on the firm's stock, investigating the deadweight costs associated with stock-and option-based compensation for a broad sample of firms. The paper also examines these costs for a set of firms where the potential for which the costs are likely to be great, namely Internet-based firms. Such firms tend to have relatively high levels of insider ownership, and typically much of the employees' pay comes from equity-linked compensation. Moreover, it is not uncommon for 1 I call the gap between managers' private value and the firm's cost a "deadweight cost" to distinguish it from the market value of the firm's compensation, which is the usual definition of "cost" in the executive compensation literature. 2 To be sure, a substantial literature investigates how features such as the probability of managerial departure (and subsequent option forfeiture), the non-tradability of options, and early exercise patterns affect option value. See, for example, Carpenter (1998) on how to adjust stock option value for the probability of forfeiture, Detemple and Sundaresan (1999) , Hall and Murphy (2000a) , Hall and Murphy (2000b) , Huddart (1994) , Kulatilaka and Marcus (1994) , and Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia (1991) on non-tradability, early exercise, and employee risk aversion, and Johnson and Tian (2000) on various other characteristics of executive stock options, such as re-pricing and reloading. The existing literature, however, has not specifically addressed how the deadweight costs associated with the lack of diversification (the only feature that is inexorably bound to compensation designed to align incentives) affect managers' private value of the option. Because the principal-agent models employed in the prior literature have only one risky asset, diversification (or lack thereof) does not enter into those models. Jin (2000) , departing from the standard practice of treating both systematic and non-systematic risk as equally costly for managers, 5 to outsiders.
3 Yermack (1995) reinforces this observation, reporting that firms award stock options more frequently when direct monitoring is difficult, that is, when accounting earnings contain large amounts of "noise." 4 Many advocates of equity-based compensation focus almost exclusively on the benefits provided by such compensation, devoting less attention to its costs. Indeed, if the only result of equitybased compensation were incentive alignment, no natural "stopping-point" would exist:
managers' compensation would be 100% equity-based. Yet, in practice, managers' pay has appeared to depend far less on firm performance than this naïve recommendation would suggest. Jensen and Murphy (1990) , for example, report that managers' share of increases in firm value averaged around three percent. In later work, Hall and Liebman (1998) find that by more exhaustively incorporating the value of executive stock options into the calculations, this sensitivity increases, but still remains relatively low.
What then prevents firms from increasing this pay-performance sensitivity? One answer is that the current sensitivity is enough to spur managers to better performance. Murphy (1985) and Core and Larcker (2000) provide some support for this hypothesis, with evidence presented by Larcker (1983) , DeFusco, Zorn and Johnson (1991) , and McConaughy and Misha (1996) somewhat more mixed. Another answer is that there are costs to such compensation, such as encouraging managers to take too much risk. But theoretical and empirical work casts doubt on whether options cause excessive managerial risk-taking, and even suggests that options might provide managers with an incentive to decrease risk. See Carpenter (2000) , Haugen and Senbet (1981) , Detemple and Sundaresan (1999) , Cohen, Hall and Viceira (2000) , and Rajgopal and Shevlin (1999) .
Another cost associated with equity-based compensation is the deadweight loss incurred when a firm pays managers in a currency that they value less than its cost to the firm. The exposure to 6 firm-specific risk is both necessary to produce the right incentives and inevitably results in managers losing some degree of diversification on their investment portfolios. As a consequence, managers face an extraordinary level of risk with respect to their personal portfolios, risk that outside investors who are able to hold diversified portfolios do not face. 8 An investor with her wealth invested solely in the average NYSE firm, for example, faces an annual volatility of 45%, twice that of the 22% annual volatility faced by an investor who is all-equity invested in a diversified market basket of stocks. Undiversified investors in volatile, Internetbased firms face even higher risk, on average five times the risk borne by a diversified investor (the volatility of Internet-based firms averages 117%, as shown in Table I) Even more importantly, managers are not compensated for this additional risk with higher expected returns. To adequately compensate the undiversified manager, the expected return of the stock would need to be commensurate with its total volatility, and not only its systematic risk component. But, the expected return is set by the firm's incremental contribution to the volatility of the market portfolio, not the total volatility, and is therefore too low to fully compensate the manager for her risk exposure. As a consequence, the manager will value equity-linked compensation at less than its market value, which represents the cost of the compensation to the firm.
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It is this "wedge" between the firm's cost and the manager's value that is the focus of this accounting provisions affected the design of stock option plans. Long (1992) investigates whether taxes or incentives motivate a firm's adoption of an executive stock option plan. 5 Even a CEO's cash compensation is subject to firm-specific risk: Lambert and Larcker (1988) find that 25% of the time-series variation in a CEO's cash compensation is related to her firm's performance. 6 Friend and Blume (1975) estimate that, on average, the human capital of individuals (including the value of any privately owned businesses) constitutes 52% to 87% of their total assets; some portion of that human capital will no doubt be specific to the firm. See Degeorge, Jenter, Moel and Tufano (2000) for a discussion of how employee's human capital affects her decision to buy her employer's stock. 7 Deferred compensation is a general liability of the firm, again exposing the manager to firm-specific risk. 8 Managers may be able to reduce some of their risk through targeted financial instruments (see footnote 11). To account for the possibility that managers can reduce their exposure the analysis below specifically derives an efficiency metric for both a fully-and a partially-diversified investor. 9 Firms do buy back stock in the open market so that they can issue equity to managers without "diluting" the firm's shareholders. So, the market value of equity-based compensation seems a good estimate of the firm's cost, whether one considers it an opportunity cost (what the market would pay for the instrument), or a real one. 7 paper.
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The wedge compels a firm with undiversified managers or employees to choose between issuing options to the market, and receiving their full value from outside investors, or granting the options to insiders, who will not value them as highly. Indeed, if one were to ignore the incentive-alignment benefits of equity-based compensation, the firm and its employees would be better off if the firm were to sell the options to outsiders, and then give the cash proceeds of such sales to its employees. Does the forced exposure to the firm's total risk impose a substantial cost on managers? On the one hand, firms do continue to issue options to their managers. On the other hand, managers appear to be taking any steps possible to reduce their risk exposures. Managers have, for example, been using swaps or zero-cost collars to reduce their risk.
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And, it is the managers of especially risky firms, such as Internet-based firms, who sell their holdings at a higher rate than managers of other firms. Meulbroek (2000a) reports that 93% of all corporate insider transactions in Internet-based firms are sales, versus 63% in non-Internet-based firms. These sales occur despite the hefty taxes that managers typically face upon selling their holdings, suggesting that managers put a high value on decreasing their risk by selling shares.
The importance of risk to managers is reinforced by the finding that managers frequently exercise their options prior to expiration, even on non-dividend paying stocks. Ofek and Yermack (2000) find that managers sell almost all shares acquired through option exercise, 10 Several papers provide good discussions of why managers value equity-linked compensation at less than the firm's cost of awarding that compensation. See, for example, Abowd and Kaplan (1999) , Carpenter (1998) , Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia (1991) , Murphy (1998) or Smith and Zimmerman (1976) . 11 The manager obtains the swap or zero-cost collar over-the-counter, typically from an investment bank. Such instruments are economically similar to selling the stock, but have different tax implications, and seem not to attract the same degree of public scrutiny as straight stock sales do. Bettis, Bizjak and Lemmon (2000) describe these contracts, and reports that the number of such transactions reported to the SEC has, so far, been relatively small. Bettis, Bizjak and Lemmon (2000) also find, however, that the SEC's reporting requirements for these transactions have only recently been clarified, so that the true incidence of zero-cost collars is perhaps higher than the historical statistics would suggest. Another way that managers might seek to limit their exposure to market risk is to short S&P 500 futures to offset the systematic risk inherent in their positions in company stock. While a theoretical possibility, in practice, few managers appear to engage in such transactions, perhaps because of the liquidity risk induced by this strategy. That is, managers would have to mark-to-market their S&P 500 positions daily, and post additional margin in case of a market increase, but they would not be able to use their holdings in company stock or options to meet the margin call. Managers can also reduce risk through equity swaps (see Bolster, Chance and Rich (1986) ), but changes in the tax code have made such swaps considerably less attractive. Boczar (1998) describes several (economically-equivalent) methods for an executive to manage risk, and the tax implications of such methods. See also Schizer (2000) on managerial hedging of stock option positions. Hedging of options can be difficult for managers as many firms prevent executive stock options from being pledged as collateral. 8 which usually occurs as soon as the options vest. Huddart and Lang (1996) report that early option exercise is more likely at riskier firms. These managerial sales have not gone unnoticed in the financial press: Directors and Boards notes that "despite the massive issuance of stock options, ownership levels of managers have not increased. Although touted as programs that make managers think like owners, stock option programs appear more like short-term bonuses, given the unwillingness of executives to retain their shares."
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Of course, a desire to gain at least some degree of diversification in order to reduce risk is not the only reason managers sell stock or exercise options. That risk reduction is an important motive, however, is supported by Meulbroek (2000a) 's finding that the market does not react negatively to managerial sales from Internet-based firms, differing significantly from the reaction to managerial sales in non-Internet-based firms. These results suggest that managerial sales in a set of risky firms do not appear to be motivated by managers' inside information, and that the market understands the great incentive that managers in such firms have to diversify. 
III. Adjusting the Value of Equity-Linked Compensation for the Loss of Diversification
The total cost imposed on the manager by her compelled holding of equity-based compensation has two components. The first is the cost associated solely with the loss in diversification. The second is the cost arising from the specific pattern of risk exposure created by the financial instrument the manager is required to hold (e.g. an option produces a certain dynamic exposure to risk over time, and that pattern may not represent the manager's preferred risk exposure, either in level or timing). Financial engineering can reduce or eliminate the second component of 9 cost, 14 but the first component, the cost due to lost diversification, cannot be eliminated without destroying incentive alignment. That is, the cost due to lost diversification is the only structural cost associated with incentive-based compensation, and is therefore the focus of this paper.
To estimate this loss-of-diversification cost, we calculate the expected return a manager would require in order to be indifferent between holding a portfolio consisting only of the firm's stock, and holding an efficiently-diversified portfolio levered to a volatility level that equals that of the firm's stock. This method, which we call the Sharpe ratio approach, produces a lower-bound estimate of the actual cost from the manager's concentrated exposure because it does not account for that manager's individual preferences regarding the level or pattern of risk exposure she faces. A manager's utility function will determine the magnitude of this individual preferencebased cost, which can be measured via a "certainty-equivalent" approach if the manager's utility function were known. Prior literature has focused on estimating the individual-specific component of cost, while implicitly assuming that there is no cost due to the loss in diversification.
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The strength of our Sharpe ratio technique is that it isolates the one type of risk that is essential to properly aligning incentives, and this firm-specific risk imposes a common cost on all managers.
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Note that even the ability of managers to choose employers, and by extension, the type of compensation package they receive, cannot reduce the deadweight costs associated with lost (2000a) reports that these results are robust to firm size: even managerial sales at small Internet-based firms are not interpreted by the market as information based. 14 Options indexed to the market are one way to eliminate systematic risk via financial engineering -see Johnson and Tian (2000) , Meulbroek (2000b) , Rappaport (1999) and Schizer (2001) . 15 For examples of this individual utility-based technique, see Hall and Murphy (2000a) , Hall and Murphy (2000b) , Huddart (1994), or Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia (1991) . If one wanted to explicitly incorporate costs of lost diversification, the models used in these papers would have to be modified to incorporate more than one risky asset, along the lines of Jin (2000) . Even then, using a specific functional form of a manager's utility function to calculate a certainty-equivalent value conflates the effect of managerial preferences about the functional form of the compensation plan with the effect due to lost diversification. For example, a manager holding a stock perfectly correlated with the market will effectively be fully-diversified. The Sharpe ratio method used in this paper tells us that the efficiency of equity-based compensation is 100%, that is, the manager will value that stock at its full market value. Yet, the utility-function approach tells us that the manager values this stock at less than its market value, simply because the risk exposure created by holding that stock is unlikely to be the optimal risk exposure for that particular manager. 16 To measure the full cost to managers imposed by any given compensation system, the Sharpe ratio method presented here could be combined with the certainty-equivalent method used in prior research. Specifically, the lackof-diversification cost estimated via the Sharpe ratio method would be used as an input to a utility-based approach.
diversification. Such self-selection may serve to reduce the loss due to individual preferences, but any compensation plan that exposes managers to firm-specific risk will result in lost diversification no matter how closely the package otherwise fits individual preferences. In this sense, self-selection plays a role similar to that of financial engineering.
A. Derivation of an Efficiency Metric for Stock-and Option-based Compensation for the

Completely Undiversified Investor
We begin with the assumption that CAPM holds instantaneously in a continuous-time model, an assumption consistent with the underlying assumptions of the Black-Scholes option-pricing model, which we use later to value the executive options.
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This assumption is not critical in the sense that the same method presented here could be adapted to incorporate any asset-pricing model (of course, the numerical estimates will change, but the technique will not). These assumptions produce mean-variance behavior. Interpreted in the context of this paper, meanvariance behavior implies that even people with high risk tolerances, such as entrepreneurs, prefer the higher expected return produced by a leveraged fully-diversified portfolio to the lower expected-return from an equally risky single-stock portfolio.
In the Black-Scholes model, and in continuous-time portfolio theory, the security market line relation is expressed in "instantaneous" expected-rates-of-return (i.e. exponential, continuous- If an undiversified investor had the market portfolio as an alternative investment opportunity, and were a mean-variance efficient investor, she would require a risk-return ratio as good as the market's risk-return ratio in order to be indifferent between holding the market portfolio and a portfolio composed exclusively of stock j. 
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where jm ρ is the correlation coefficient between firm j's returns and the market returns. Figure I displays this return premium graphically.
[insert figure I about here] ii. Using j s to calculate the value of stock j to an undiversified investor
value of stock j at time t (the market price).
≡ T date at which the undiversified investor is free to sell the stock.
which is the private value placed on the stock of j by investor forced to hold the stock j position undiversified until date T, where
In the analysis below, we assume for analytical simplicity that the firm does not pay dividends during T t ≤ , the duration of the sale restrictions. The zero-dividend assumption seems reasonable for Internet-based firms, and young entrepreneurial firms more generally.
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By definition of j r , we know that the discounted expected future value of firm j at time T equals today's stock price.
where { } t E • is the conditional expectation of the value of the shares of j at T, conditional on the information available at time t. And similarly, by definition of , u j r we know that the expected future value of the firm to the undiversified investor discounted by u j r is the value of the firm today to that investor.
But, at date T, the undiversified investor is free to sell her shares in the open market (think of T as being the time at which the shares vest)
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, so therefore, at date T for every outcome, the value of the stock to the undiversified investor,
V t , will equal the market value of the firm:
and hence this statement must hold expectationally as well:
Substituting (6) into (4) and (5), we have
e e e e τ τ τ τ
The manager's private value of the stock today is its market value today, discounted by the incremental amount required to compensate the manager for the firm's total risk. Figure II displays this process graphically.
The "efficiency" of stock compensation to an undiversified investor, ε , is the ratio of the stock's value to an undiversified employee relative to the cost of that compensation to the firm. This efficiency calculation does not assume or require that cash flows follow any particular pattern, nor does it depend upon any specific valuation model.
[insert Figure II about here]
Equation 8 suggests that the longer a manager is constrained to hold an undiversified portfolio, the less it is worth to her. It also reveals that efficiency increases with the stock's correlation to the market: the higher the correlation -or the stock's beta -the closer the stock's expected return gets to the market's expected return, which lowers j s , the undiversified manager's required expected return premium. In the limit, a manager holding a single-stock portfolio which happens to be perfectly correlated with the market will essentially be fully-diversified, and will not require any additional return premium. Following equation 8, a three-year vesting period and a 1% required expected return premium yields an efficiency of 97%, a 10% expected return stock, and not seek employment. Finally, structuring a compensation system around the assumption (or hope) that managers know the firm to be undervalued hardly seems a wise strategy.
premium decreases efficiency to 74%, and a 20% required expected return premium translates into a 54% efficiency level. Loss of diversification has the potential to significantly affect the manager's private value of the firm's stock.
Equation 8 also provides some support for our earlier speculation that start-up companies in risky industries produce the greatest gap between the cost of equity-linked compensation and the value of such compensation to undiversified insiders. Start-up firms are likely to meet the conditions because they are often highly volatile, yet the volatility may, at first, be mostly a function of firm-specific factors (e.g.. is the new product a success, can the firm get the necessary funding for its projects, do suppliers provide the expected raw materials in a timely fashion), resulting in a low β . Over time, as the new firm becomes better-established and overcomes the many obstacles facing start-ups (logistical or otherwise), market risks may represent a larger proportion of the firm's total risk profile, so that β will increase even if σ remains unchanged. Today's market conditions create the potential for very low efficiency levels. That is, the confluence of rapidly-changing technology, the emergence of many start-up firms to capitalize on this technological change, coupled with a tendency for such firms to compensate management largely through equity-linked compensation all play a role in reducing efficiency levels.
iii. Calculating the efficiency of option-based compensation: a two-stage approach
The derivation of the discount for lack-of-diversification on an option parallels that of the lackof-diversification for the stock, presented above, but is more complex because both the expected return and the standard deviation of the option change at every point in time.
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As in the discussion of the stock discount, we assume that the employee will be indifferent between concentrated-versus-efficiently-diversified exposures if he or she is presented with the same (instantaneous) Sharpe ratio in either case, which again produces a lower-bound on the undiversified investor's discount. This lower-bound results from the willingness of some employees to give up an additional amount in expected return terms to change their total level of risk or to pursue a dynamic risk strategy that differs from that of an option.
20 I thank Robert C. Merton for his assistance with this derivation.
We refer to the instantaneous expected return on the employee's option as jo r , where j is the subscript representing the firm, and o represents "option". As shown in Merton (1992, p.377, (11.62) ), the instantaneous expected return on the employee's option is given by 2 2 1 2
where ( ) , f V τ is the Black-Scholes value of the option and subscripts on f denote partial derivatives with respect to the share price V and time until expiration, τ .
Similarly, from Merton (1992, p. 377, (11.63 )), we have the instantaneous standard deviation of the return on the option, jo σ , can be written as:
It follows from (10) that the instantaneous expected excess return, jo f r r − , can be expressed as:
and taking the ratio of (11) to (10), we have that the instantaneous Sharpe ratio of the option return is given by:
Following the stock efficiency derivation, if we now require that the option be priced so that at every point in time it has a Sharpe ratio equal to the Shape ratio of the market portfolio, we have from (12):
By rearranging terms, f must satisfy the partial differential equation:
Noting that
β ρ σ σ = and substituting for j r from (1) into (14):
where u j j j s r r ≡ − , the return premium that an undiversified investor in the stock would require to make her indifferent between holding the stock and holding the market portfolio levered to the volatility level of the stock. From (15) and the definition of j s :
By inspection, this equation is the partial differential equation for the Black-Scholes optionpricing formula on a stock which pays a proportional dividend at rate j s (see Merton (1992, p. 295, (8.44) ). The well-known solution to this partial differential equation is the Black-Scholes formula for a proportional dividend on stock:
where
we find that the pricing on an option that at every point in time provides an instantaneous Sharpe-ratio equal to the instantaneous Sharpe ratio on the market portfolio is exactly the BlackScholes formula on a non-dividend paying stock where we replace the market price of the stock j V by its discounted value,
which is the Black-Scholes formula with u j V as the stock price. Therefore, the pricing on an option that at every point in time provides an instantaneous Sharpe-ratio equal to the instantaneous Sharpe ratio on the market portfolio is exactly the Black-Scholes formula on a non-dividend paying stock where we replace the market price of the stock j V by its discounted private value, u j V , as indicated below, where F represents the efficiency of the option.
( ,
where the exercise price (X) is j V , the amount a manager would actually have to pay to exercise the option, and the denominator is the market value of the option. Note that as most executive stock options are issued at-the-money, for consistency we adopt the same convention.
iv. Stock efficiency versus option efficiency
The efficiency of the option is less than the efficiency of the underlying stock. To see this, note that by the homogeneity property (Merton (1992) , theorem 8.5) and the property that a lower exercise price leads to a higher option value, we have 21
And dividing by ( , ) j F V X reveals that the option efficiency, F must always be less than the efficiency, ε .
The dynamics of option efficiency are similar to those for stock efficiency. As the expected rate of return premium increases, option efficiency decreases, and as vesting periods increase, option efficiency decreases. Changes in the required expected rate of return premium have a larger effect on the option efficiency than do changes in the vesting period. And, as the time until option maturity increases, efficiency increases, but only slightly.
B. An Efficiency Metric for Stock-and Option-based Compensation for the Partially-Diversified Investor
The efficiency measures outlined above assume that the manager is compelled to hold all of her wealth in equity or options of the firm and is therefore completely undiversified. While this assumption may be a good approximation for managers in Internet start-up firms, managers in more mature firms may have investment portfolios that are better diversified. If the manager is able to at least partially diversify her holdings, the efficiency of equity-based compensation will rise, but by how much? Under partial diversification, the volatility faced by the manager will be a mix of the firm's volatility and the volatility of the manager's other holdings, and, as a 21 I thank Alex Triantis for pointing this out. 20 consequence, the premium required by the manager, j s , will decrease. If we assume that the manager achieves this partial diversification by investing some of her holdings in the market portfolio (scaled by the riskless asset) we can again derive the value of equity-linked compensation to this partially diversified manager (Appendix A contains this derivation). For this partially-diversified investor with weight w invested in stock j and (1-w) in the market portfolio, where σ p equals the standard deviation of the combined market plus stock j portfolio, the efficiency is: 
The option efficiency calculation parallels that for the case of the completely undiversified investor.
Figures III and IV demonstrate graphically how partial diversification affects stock and option efficiency respectively, corresponding to a hypothetical firm with the same mean and volatility of the average firm (the equally-weighted average beta for all NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX firms is 0.77, with volatility of 65%). We can see that the ability to partially diversify helps, but perhaps not as much as one might expect. For example, the ability to diversify by holding 50% of one's wealth in the market portfolio increases option efficiency to 63% (from the completely- To better understand how economically significant the loss in efficiency for equity-based compensation might be, this section applies the efficiency metrics derived above to a broad sample of firms. Specifically, we calculate stock and option efficiency metrics for all NYSE, 21 AMEX, and NASDAQ firms listed as of December 31, 1998 examining separately the results for a sample of Internet-based firms defined by the Hambrecht & Quist (H&Q) Internet Index.
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The efficiency metrics require estimates of β and σ for each firm as inputs. To estimate a firm's β, we use the market model, incorporating the last 150 trading days of returns data prior to
December 31, 1998, and using CRSP's value-weighted market composite index. We use these same 150 trading days of returns data to estimate each individual firm's σ. The estimate of the market's volatility, σ m uses the returns of CRSP's value-weighted market composite index over this same time period. We assume a risk-premium of 7.5% (7.2% continuously-compounded), the historical average amount by which the value-weighted market index exceeds the long-term government bond rate (monthly data begins in 1926). of her total wealth invested in the firm, that manager would, on average, value stock compensation at 91% of its cost to the firm for a three-year vesting period, and 85% for a fiveyear vesting period.
The higher volatility of NASDAQ and Internet-based firms results in efficiency levels that are substantially lower than those associated with NYSE firms. A completely undiversified manager with all of her wealth invested in an Internet-based firm values stock compensation at 55% of its cost to the firm, for the three-year vesting period, a number that decreases to 38% if the vesting period lasts five years. The stock efficiency ratings for NASDAQ firms are similar to the Internet-based firms, but somewhat higher. Partial diversification helps increase efficiency, but its absolute level remains low. The mean stock efficiency for an Internet-based manager with 50% of his wealth invested in the firm is 60% for the three-year vesting period, only five percentage points higher than the manager with 100% of her wealth invested in the firm. If the vesting period increases to five years, the mean stock efficiency decreases to 45% for the manager able to hold 50% of her wealth outside the firm. Table III , with Panels A through E shares a similar structure to Table II , but provides summary statistics for option efficiency levels for varying levels of diversification, vesting periods, and option maturity levels. We approximate the value of an executive stock option using the BlackScholes option pricing formula. Strictly speaking, the Black-Scholes formula provides the approximate value, rather than the exact value, of an executive stock option.
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For simplicity and clarity, however, we present the results using the Black-Scholes value, recognizing that the estimates are only approximate.
The completely undiversified manager values executive stock options at 53% of their cost to the mean Internet-based firm, assuming a three-year vesting period, and ten-year options. This number increases to 55% if the manager is able to keep 25% of her wealth outside the firm, or 59% if the manager is able to keep 50% of her wealth outside the firm. See Appendix C for a more detailed display of stock-and option-efficiency levels for individual Internet-based firms.
As with the stock efficiency numbers, the mean option efficiencies for NASDAQ firms are very similar to those of Internet-based firms. Finally, the mean gap between the manager's private value of executive stock options and the cost of those options to the firm is lower for NYSE firms, but it is not insignificant. The mean efficiency associated with a three-year vesting period 23 The formula is an approximation because executive stock options have some of the features of American options (i.e. exercisable at any time after the options vest, whereas the Black-Scholes formula prices European options), and because the options issued by the firm, like warrants, may dilute the ownership stake of the existing shareholders. See Merton (1992) pp.363-4, on warrant dilution. This dilution can have a significant affect on option value if firms use many stock options. In addition, see Section V which discusses the effect of early exercise, option forfeiture by managers who leave the firm, and the re-pricing of out-of-the-money options.
and a ten-year option is 70% for the NYSE manager who has 100% of her wealth invested in the company, and this figure increases to 83% if that manager is able to invest 75% of her wealth outside the firm. Overall, the order of magnitude of the results is striking, and illustrates that equity-linked compensation can cost the firm much more than it is worth to managers.
V. Robustness of the Efficiency Measure
This section explores the robustness of our approach to measuring the cost efficiency of stock options for incentive compensation, as well as the effects of other departures from our initial assumptions.
A. Effect of Alternative Asset Pricing Dynamics
The preceding analysis and development of our efficiency measure assumes that the risk-free interest rate is constant over time and that geometric Brownian-motion processes describe stock However, as a well-known empirical matter, this model is not adequate to capture fully the richness of real-world asset-return distributions and option prices. For example, real-world interest rates do change over time, as do measured variance and covariances of asset returns, and asset-return distributions appear to have "fatter-tails" or more outliers than a lognormal distribution would predict. These departures from the prototypical model result in a stochastic investment opportunity set, and it is likely that there will be other dimensions of risk besides market risk that will "matter" to investors and hence will be "priced."
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Such departures from the prototypical model have two potential effects. First, they may add another risk factor to the asset-pricing model, and second, they will also affect which specific option-pricing model is appropriate for the task at hand. With other dimensions of risk that matter, we can no longer be sure that the "first-stage" discounting of the individual stock price to equate its instantaneous Sharpe ratio to that of the market portfolio will leave the investor indifferent between the undiversified single-stock holding and the equivalent-volatility holding of the market portfolio and the risk-free asset. Furthermore, the stochastic nature of the market's Sharpe ratio will make the multi-year discounting technique used to arrive at the overall initial discount more complicated in much the same way that stochastic interest rates complicate multiperiod bond pricing, or for that matter, any capital budgeting DCF problem.
If one knew the structure of the "true" ICAPM, then a multi-dimensional version of our Sharpe ratio analysis could be used to find the discount on the stock price necessary to match the "best" risk-return tradeoff available for each of the dimensions of priced risks. Indeed, such a multidimensional procedure could also be applied if either the Ross (1976) Arbitrage Pricing Theory or the Fama and French (1992) three-factor model were the governing asset pricing model. In all these models, the elimination of risk through holdings of "well-diversified" portfolios is a central element in equilibrium pricing. Therefore, in the absence of knowing which of these models is the best descriptor of real-world pricing, the simplified procedure of the preceding section may
give an incomplete, but not necessarily any less accurate, estimate of the cost of imposing a single-stock exposure on an individual investor. Moreover, as indicated at the outset, our objective is to accept lower-bound (versus best) estimates of the costs in return for simplicity and robustness of the analysis. In that spirit, the multiple dimensions of risks in these more complex models, in which securities serve hedging as well as diversification roles, will make securities less perfect substitutes for one another, and are therefore likely to increase the shadow cost of imposing single stock holdings for much of an investor's wealth.
The choice of option-pricing model will also reflect deviations from the prototypical case outlined above. One long-recognized empirical departure from that case is stock return distributions that have "fatter-tails" than a lognormal distribution would predict, perhaps as a result of a jump process, stochastic interest rates, or stochastic volatility. Fortunately, there is an extensive academic and practitioner literature on how to modify the Black-Scholes model for each of these generalizations.
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Thus, although a stochastic investment opportunity may change the quantitative valuation, it does not change the basic two-stage methodology developed in the preceding section.
There are, of course, an uncountable number of variations possible for asset pricing models and so any review of the robustness of our procedure cannot be exhaustive. But, for any given deviation from the prototypical case, we can modify the formulas of the two-stage process for calculating the efficiency cost of stock options, and thereby improve our estimates over the prototypical case. However, without knowing the specific structural variation, the signs of risk premiums on all risk factors other than diversification (that is, market risk) are not signed a priori and thus, the error in the estimated efficiency numbers from neglecting these factors can be either positive or negative.
Under all the various models, no matter how many risk factors, the essential point remains unchanged: creating incentive alignment for firm-specific activities will always require that the executive be exposed to idiosyncratic risks through a less-than-efficiently diversified holding.
Hence, given the same expectations, the executive will always place a lower value on equitybased compensation than the market would pay for that same instrument. Furthermore, a common and important element of risk in all equilibrium asset models is that risk which cannot be eliminated in well-diversified portfolios. This is the market risk identified explicitly in our analysis of the preceding sections. In general, the option pricing formulas used in stage two of our process will be affected materially by stochastic volatility and interest rates. However, if volatility levels are very large (as they are for Internet-based firms), then the estimates of the loss-of-diversification costs will be of similar order of magnitude to the ones described in the prototypical case.
B. Does the market value of equity-linked compensation accurately reflect the firm's cost?
In deriving the efficiency measures we assumed that the firm's cost of equity-based compensation was adequately captured by the market value of that compensation, under the theory that the market value reflected the firm's opportunity cost of issuing those equity-linked instruments. But we also know that executive stock options tend to be exercised as soon as they vest (but well before they expire), and that managers must sometimes forfeit their options when they leave the firm, voluntarily or involuntarily, conditions that would not occur if diversified investors were the holders of these instruments. Is it possible that these early exercises and forfeitures reduce the firm's cost of equity-based compensation below its market value, thereby increasing efficiency?
While early exercises and forfeitures will indeed reduce the firm's cost, they also eliminate the incentive-alignment benefit associated with options. That is, both early exercises and forfeitures require that the firm issue additional options to re-align incentives, either to existing managers or to new hires.
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And, these conditions are state contingent: managers exercise early only when options are in-the-money, and presumably managers are more likely to leave the firm (and forfeit options) when the firm is doing poorly. Firms also tend to re-price options to re-align incentives when the stock price falls and options are too far out-of-the money to provide effective incentives. Cuny and Jorion (1995) shows that this correlation significantly increases the value of the option above its Black-Scholes "market" value (which is the value used in this paper to measure the firm's cost of awarding options).
Because the firm always seeks incentive alignment, we should really consider the "cost" of incentive alignment as a continual stream of payments. When we posit that the market value of a ten-year option is much higher than the firm's cost of that option due to early exercise or forfeiture, we ignore the duration of the option. Consider the oft-used example in capital budgeting of a wooden bridge and a steel bridge. The wooden bridge may cost $1 million to build, and last three years, while the steel bridge may cost twice as much, and last nine years. If we directly compare the $1 million cost of the wooden bridge to that of the $2 million steel bridge, without considering the life of the project, we would conclude that the wooden bridge is 26 See Gilson and Vestuypens (1993) .
cheaper than the steel bridge. But if we want a bridge for the next nine years, it is "cheaper" to build the more expensive steel bridge because it need not be replaced as often.
The same logic holds with executive stock options. A ten-year option granted to managers may be "cheaper" than a ten-year option issued on the open market, but the effective life of the investment differs. If the manager exercises the ten-year option after, say, two years, the firm must replace those options to maintain incentive alignment: an option with a ten-year maturity may not deliver ten years of incentive alignment. The market value of the ten-year option approximates the firm's cost to the extent that it approximates issuing five successive grants of options that the manager exercises after two years.
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In sum, early exercise and forfeiture may reduce the firm's cost of the option below its market value, but not as much as one might initially suspect after taking account of the need to continually maintain incentive alignment through future option grants.
VI. Conclusions
Boards and their compensation advisors attempt to measure the value of the compensation packages they award, but rarely do they study the real cost of these plans, measured as the difference between the market value of the instruments granted in these plans and the value placed on those instruments by the managers who receive them as compensation. These costs arise because the exposure to firm-specific risk that aligns incentives is costly to managers, who can no longer fully diversify their portfolios. Financial engineering, either by the firm or by the managers, can eliminate the systematic portion of managers' risk exposure, but cannot eliminate managers' firm-specific exposure without forfeiting the incentive alignment benefits of such compensation. Without the ability to fully diversify, managers will always value their equitybased compensation at less than its market value, and the firm will always face a tradeoff between the benefit of incentive-alignment, and the cost of paying managers with instruments that the firm could otherwise issue at a higher price in the market. 27 The question of interest then becomes how much does it cost the firm to provide ten (or any other number) years of incentive alignment. See Ofek and Yermack (2000) and Huddart and Lang (1996) for data concerning early exercise of options and resulting stock sales. Carpenter (1998) proposes and tests two option-pricing models that explicitly incorporate early exercise and forfeiture. Acharya, John and Sindaram (2000) , Brenner, Sundaram and Yermack (2000) , and Chance, Kumar and Todd (2000) analyze (both theoretically and empirically) the effect of That an undiversified manager values equity-linked compensation at less than its market value is not surprising; the striking result of this paper is how sizeable this difference is. This paper presents a straightforward, broadly-applicable method to estimate the cost to managers of their loss in diversification. The proposed method measures the cost of holding an employer's stock relative to holding a diversified market portfolio, and then applies that method to large sample of firms. We find that an undiversified manager of an Internet-based firm, for example, values her option-based compensation at an average of 53% of its cost to the firm; if that manager can partially diversify, holding 50% of her assets in the market portfolio, the value of her compensation still remains quite low, at 59% of its cost to the firm. The numbers for NYSE firms are somewhat higher, with undiversified managers valuing their stock options at an average of 70% of their cost to the firm. If that manager holds the majority of his wealth outside the firm (say 75%), the efficiency increases to 88%.
Not only is the magnitude of the gap between the firm's cost and the employee's value remarkably large, it is likely an underestimate of the true loss managers experience through their compelled holding of equity-linked compensation. The method produces a lower bound on the true loss since it excludes the effect of manager-specific preferences about risk exposures. That is, some managers would willingly exchange a portion of their expected return from the benchmark leveraged market portfolio for better tailoring the form of compensation to meet their preferences (e.g. changing overall volatility levels or changing to another form of contingent claim).
One notable implication of these results is that managers can believe that their firm's stock is significantly undervalued, and nevertheless have a strong incentive to sell the stock whenever they are not restricted from doing so. Indeed, the numbers above suggest that a manager of an Internet-based firm can believe that the stock of her firm is 47% too low, and still benefit from selling the stock. This finding underscores the difficulty of interpreting managers' sales in such firms as a clear signal that managers believe the firm to be overvalued.
resetting (decreasing) option strike prices to maintain incentive alignment when the options move too far out-of-themoney.
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The relatively large magnitude of the deadweight costs associated with equity-based compensation suggests that its corresponding benefits must also be great, if firms are compensating managers optimally. On average, firms appear to recognize the tradeoff between the costs and benefits of such compensation, behaving as if the costs relate to the level of firmspecific risk that managers are required to bear: Jin (2000) finds that pay becomes less sensitive to performance as firm-specific risk increases. However, the vast differences that we observe in compensation packages raises the issue of whether some compensation plans are weighted too heavily towards equity-linked compensation to be cost effective. At one end of the spectrum is Amazon.com, which pays founder and 34% owner Jeffrey Bezos exclusively in cash, a practice consistent with the belief that it deems Bezos's incentives appropriately aligned without any additional equity-based compensation (Appendix C shows that Amazon.com's efficiency metric is 57%). At the other end of the spectrum is Dell Computer Corp., whose founder and 12%
owner Michael Dell receives most of his compensation in options. In 1998, for example, Mr. Such differences in compensation practices also highlight the need for periodic re-evaluation of compensation practices. Just as the benefits offered by equity-based compensation will change over time as the firm grows and matures, the costs will change as well. And as market conditions change, compensation practices may need to change: today's firms are more volatile on average (both in terms of total and idiosyncratic risk), and more of their compensation is equity-based, 30 conditions which increase the deadweight costs of such compensation over prior levels.
30
Certainly with advances in financial engineering, the costs of exposing managers to risk can be minimized, but the base levels as measured in this paper cannot be decreased.
Appendix A
Derivation of an Efficiency Metric for Stock-and Option-based Compensation for the Partially-Diversified Investor
Let p represent the portfolio of a partially-diversified investor with w fraction of her wealth in stock j, and (1-w) fraction of her wealth in the market portfolio. Then: 
For a mean-variance-optimizing investor to be indifferent between portfolio p and the market portfolio, the investor requires a return with a risk-return profile equal to that of the market. We again use the Sharpe ratio to estimate this return, and substituting in (10) for (7), the value of stock j to the partially-diversified investor is: 
Diversified Undiversified
FIGURE IV Sensitivity of Option Compensation Efficiency to Portfolio Diversification
Assumes manager free to sell option in 3 years and a 10-years option issued at-the-money. Beta (β) is estimated using the market model, using 150 trading days of daily returns data from CRSP, and the value-weighted market composite (all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms).
Volatility is also estimated using 150 trading days of daily returns and annualizing the resulting daily volatility. Firms with fewer than 100 trading days of returns during this 150-day estimation window preceding 12/31/98 are not included. Yearly turnover is estimated by aggregating fourth quarter trading volume from CRSP, then dividing by shares outstanding, and annualizing this number. the market and holding an undiversified portfolio, calculated using the market's composite Sharpe ratio. "Efficiency of Equity (V j u /V j )" is the ratio of the value of the stock to the undiversified manager to the firm's cost of that stock. Omega (ω) is the percentage of a manager's portfolio constrained to a single stock (ω = 100% for the completely undiversified manager). "Vesting Period (τ)" is the time in years until the manager is free to sell his/her shares. Beta (β) is estimated using the market model, using 150 trading days of daily returns data from CRSP, and the value-weighted market composite (all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms). Annual volatility is also estimated using 150 trading days of daily returns and annualizing the resulting daily volatility. Firms with fewer than 100 trading days of returns during this 150-day estimation window preceding 12/31/98 are not included. A market premium of 7.5% (7.23%, continously-compounded) is assumed. The "return premium (s j )" is the percent premium above the firm's equilibrium market return required by an undiversified investor to make that investor indifferent between holding 37 the market and holding an undiversified portfolio, calculated using the market's composite Sharpe ratio. "Efficiency of Equity (V j u /V j )" is the ratio of the value of the stock to the undiversified manager to the firm's cost of that stock. Omega (ω) is the percentage of a manager's portfolio constrained to a single stock (ω = 100% for the completely undiversified manager). "Vesting Period (τ)" is the time in years until the manager is free to sell his/her shares.
Constrained to a Single
TABLE II (cont.) Efficiency of Stock-Based Compensation By Firm Type and Manager's Ability to Diversify
Beta (β) is estimated using the market model, using 150 trading days of daily returns data from CRSP, and the value-weighted market composite (all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms). Annual volatility is also estimated using 150 trading days of daily returns and annualizing the resulting daily volatility. Firms with fewer than 100 trading days of returns during this 150-day estimation window preceding 12/31/98 are not included. A market premium of 7.5% (7.23%, continously-compounded) is assumed. The "return premium (s j )" is the percent premium above the firm's equilibrium market return required by an undiversified investor to make that investor indifferent between holding 38 the market and holding an undiversified portfolio, calculated using the market's composite Sharpe ratio. "Efficiency of Equity (V j u /V j )" is the ratio of the value of the stock to the undiversified manager to the firm's cost of that stock. Omega (ω) is the percentage of a manager's portfolio constrained to a single stock (ω = 100% for the completely undiversified manager). "Vesting Period (τ)" is the time in years until the manager is free to sell his/her shares.
Beta (β) is estimated using the market model, using 150 trading days of daily returns data from CRSP, and the value-weighted market composite (all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms). Annual volatility is also estimated using 150 trading days of daily returns and annualizing the resulting daily volatility. Firms with fewer than 100 trading days of returns during this 150-day estimation window preceding 12/31/98 are not included. A market premium of 7.5% (7.23%, continously-compounded) is assumed. The "return premium (s j )" is the percent premium above the firm's equilibrium market return required by an undiversified investor to make that investor indifferent between holding 
Constrained to a Single Stock
Beta (β) is estimated using the market model, using 150 trading days of daily returns data from CRSP, and the value-weighted market composite (all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms). Annual volatility is also estimated using 150 trading days of daily returns and annualizing the resulting daily volatility. Firms with fewer than 100 trading days of returns during this 150-day estimation window preceding 12/31/98 are not included. A market premium of 7.5% (7.23%, continously-compounded) is assumed. The "return premium (s j )" is the percent premium above the firm's equilibrium market return required by an undiversified investor to make that investor indifferent between holding the market and holding an undiversified portfolio, calculated using the market's composite Sharpe ratio. "Efficiency of Options" is the ratio between the value of the stock options to the partially-diversified manager to the firm's cost of those stock options. The Balck-Scholes option pricing formula is used to price the options. The divident yield is assumed to be zero. Omega (ω) is the percentage of a manager's portfolio constrained to a single stock (ω = 100% for the completely undiversified manager). "Vesting Period (τ)" is the time in years until the manager is free to sell his/her shares. Beta (β) is estimated using the market model, using 150 trading days of daily returns data from CRSP, and the value-weighted market composite (all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms). Annual volatility is also estimated using 150 trading days of daily returns and annualizing the resulting daily volatility. Firms with fewer than 100 trading days of returns during this 150-day estimation window preceding 12/31/98 are not included. A market premium of 7.5% (7.23%, continously-compounded) is assumed. The "return premium (s j )" is the percent premium above the firm's equilibrium market return required by an undiversified investor to make that investor indifferent between holding the market and holding an undiversified portfolio, calculated using the market's composite Sharpe ratio. "Efficiency of Options" is the ratio between the value of the stock options to the partially-diversified manager to the firm's cost of those stock options. The Black-Scholes option pricing formula is used to price the options. The divident yield is assumed to be zero. Omega (ω) is the percentage of a manager's portfolio constrained to a single stock (ω = 100% for the completely undiversified manager). "Vesting Period (τ)" is the time in years until the manager is free to sell his/her shares. Beta (β) is estimated using the market model, using 150 trading days of daily returns data from CRSP, and the value-weighted market composite (all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms). Annual volatility is also estimated using 150 trading days of daily returns and annualizing the resulting daily volatility. Firms with fewer than 100 trading days of returns during this 150-day estimation window preceding 12/31/98 are not included. A market premium of 7.5% (7.23%, continously-compounded) is assumed. The "return premium (s j )" is the percent premium above the firm's equilibrium market return required by an undiversified investor to make that investor indifferent between holding the market and holding an undiversified portfolio, calculated using the market's composite Sharpe ratio. "Efficiency of Options" is the ratio between the value of the stock options to the partially-diversified manager to the firm's cost of those stock options. The Black-Scholes option pricing formula is used to price the options. The divident yield is assumed to be zero. Omega (ω) is the percentage of a manager's portfolio constrained to a single stock (ω = 100% for the completely undiversified manager). "Vesting Period (τ)" is the time in years until the manager is free to sell his/her shares. 
Panel E: All Firms
EFFICIENCY OF OPTIONS
Beta (β) estimated with 150 days of daily returns (ending 12/31/98) and the value-weighted market composite market index. Firms with fewer than 42 days of returns during this window were dropped. Return premium (s j ) is the expected return needed to made an undiversified manager indifferent between holding a single-stack portfolio of her firm's stock and holding a market porfoltio levered to an equivalent volatility level. Efficiency of Equity (Vju/Vj) equals the value of the stock to an undiversified investor divided by market value. Efficiency of Options is the value of an option to an undiversified manager divided by the market value of the option. The assumed market risk premium is 7.5%. Uses the Black-Scholes option-pricing model, assuming no dividends. Vesting period equals 3 years.
